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Introduction
Nature of the Problem
Technical progress has contributed to the development of an enormous
variety of new products, most of which are safe and reliable. But some products,
even if they enable the user to do things more efficiently than he could before,
ofttimes pose a certain risk to life, limb or property. The crucial policy question
facing decision makers in every country in the world is-all things considered,
who should bear the risk? I Should it be the manufacturer, who has, let us say,
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product? Or should
liability fall on the retailer, who generally is quite unaware of the existence of
latent defects in the many different types of products which he is marketing,
especially if the products come in mass produced packages or containers? Or,
in keeping with the maxim caveat emptor, should the loss fall on the consumer,
who normally knows even less about the existence of possible defects in the
product than the retailer, and whose state in life practically necessitates that
he rely on a wide variety of products in order to perform a whole series of routine
occupational and recreational activities? In seeking to influence human be-
havior in this area, should the policy maker place emphasis on the duty to exer-
cise due care, or should he accept as inevitable the fact that some products are
bound to be manufactured imperfectly, that these imperfections are going to
cause some damage and injury, and that the cost thereof should be spread on
all of society by means of some form of insurance?
*J.D. 1960, Fordham; Dr. Jur. 1965, Koln, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law.
'For discussions of the policy problems, see generally, Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUDIES 151
(1973); Fletcher. Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Calabresi and
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability. 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972); and Posner, Strict
Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 205 (1973).
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The answers to these questions involve the consideration of several academic
disciplines. This article will explore the problem with reference to the law of
the Soviet Union. However, the approach adopted will not be exclusively legal.
It is clear that the decision to allow or not to allow a person who has been
injured by a defective product to recover damages from the seller or manufac-
turer of that product has immediate and perceptible economic consequences.
It may also imperceptibly influence human behavior. Some believe that a fault
requirement for liability enhances the standard of care and acts as a deterrent
to carelessness. Others feel that basing the manufacturer's liability on fault is
too cumbersome, involving elements of proof most of which are exclusively
within the ken and control of the manufacturer, and that if you are to succeed
in raising his standards, you must impose strict liability on him regardless
of fault.
Economics offers an example. In the United States, rules developed by the
courts have gone so far in imposing liability on the manufacturer that some
firms have been literally forced out of business.2 Those that manage to stay in
business are compelled to shift the burden of high court awards, plus the prem-
iums for liability insurance, onto the consuming public in the form of increased
product prices. It was judicially planned this way. By holding the manufacturer
strictly liable, so a New Jersey court said in 1960, "the burden of losses con-
sequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a position
to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when
they do occur." 3
In a majority of jurisdictions the United States, a person injured by a defec-
tively manufactured product may recover compensatory damages from the
manufacturer if he can prove: (1) the fact of his injury; (2) the fact that the
injury was caused by a defect in the product; and (3) the fact that the defect
was in the product before it left the control of the manufacturer. In most states,
the plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer was negligent, that he stood
in contractual privity with him, or that the manufacturer breached an express
warranty to him. Given the facts stated above, strict liability in tort is imposed
on the manufacturer. 4
I
Defective Products in the Soviet Union
From a comparative point of view, many of the objective factors associated
'See the report in the Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1975, pp. I, 12.
'Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (New Jersey, 1960). See also
Brandenburger v. Toyoto Motor Sales, U.S.A.. Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Montana, 1973), where the
court reviewed a long list of judicially perceived public policies.
'Section 402 A of 2ND RESTATEMENT OF TORTS.
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with products liability are present in the Soviet economy.' Most products are
mass produced, reaching the consumer only after having passed through several
intermediate processing and distributing organizations. Moreover, as is well
known, the quality of Soviet products has been traditionally poor. A casual
reading of the popular Soviet press-letters to the editor of Pravda; cartoons
in Krokodil-is sufficient to alert the reader to a problem of potentially stag-
gering proportions. Typical is an account in Izvestia of how a state enterprise
named Tatspetsmontazh turns out defective silos:
Of seventeen new fodder storage facilities built in Nizhnekamsk District last year,
only two are in working condition. The rest, although legally accepted for operation,
can store little more than air. One of them even collapsed from a gust of wind. The
gust of wind did not blow away the acceptance document, however. Of 93 silos erected
in Tataria in the last 5 years, only seven are functioning today. What is more,
Tatspetsmontazh has also been building silos [elsewhere]. How many of those are
functional no one knows. Since the clients do not speak up, more and more of these
unfinished structures are being accepted for operation. This situation seems to be
benefiting no one except the Tatspetsmontazh building trust. Its performance reports
indicate a very high level of production plan fulfillment.'
Consider also this account taken from Pravda:
We heard alarming facts at the Georgian Ministry of Trade's Chief Administration
for the State Inspection of the Quality of Goods and Trade. Thirty-five percent of the
inspected goods produced by local industry last year either had their quality rating
reduced or were completely rejected. Thus all leather footwear, socks and stockings
and galvanized dishware were returned to the suppliers. The trade network refused to
accept 27 different kinds and varieties of products manufactured at 11 of the branch's
enterprises. It's no accident that out of more than 2,000 varieties of goods with local
industry trademarks only two bear the Seal of Quality.7
For the Western reader, however, perhaps the most publicized example of
Soviet sub-standard production is that associated with the problems which Fiat
was experiencing in building the car factory in Togliatti. According to a report
in Time, which was later confirmed by Pravda, ". . . fully half the parts fur-
nished by Soviet suppliers had to be discarded." 8
So it is clear that there are plenty of products which are manufactured defec-
tively in the Soviet Union. Despite the strident appeals made in the XXV Party
Congress to raise the quality of life in the USSR by paying more attention to
the quality of the work-product, many of these defective products leave Soviet
'For an overview, see NovE, THE SOVIET ECONOMY, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C.:
Praeger. 2nd rev. ed., 1969.
6Castles in the Air, taken from the June 1, 1976 issue of Izvestia, translated in vol. 28 CURRENT
DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 22, June 30, 1976, p. 26.
'Checking on Quality: Manufactured Locally, taken from the February 27, 1975 issue of Pravda,
translated in vol. 27 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 9, March 26, 1975, pp.. 25-26.
'East-West Trade: Ordeal on the Volga. Time, 5 March 1973, p. 60.
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factories and are delivered to other state enterprises or are sold as consumer
items to the general public. In looking for evidence of products liability analogs
in the USSR, we shall focus on the general problem of poor quality production.
Probably the best way to go about this problem is to ask this question: What
happens in the Soviet Union when defective products are put into the stream
of commerce? If the product has been delivered pursuant to a supply contract,
what remedies does the disappointed consignee have against the manufacturer-
supplier? If the product has been sold by a sales contract to a member of the
general public, what remedy does the disappointed consumer have against the
seller? Against the manufacturer?
Remedies of the Consumer
IN CONTRACT
According to the Civil Code, 9 the quality of a product sold to a consumer must
correspond to the terms of the contract, or if the contract is silent on this point,
to customary demands (§ 245 C.C.). If the product should prove defective, the
Code gives the consumer a choice of remedies. He may demand:
Either substitution of a proper article, as defined in the contract by generic
characteristics, for the article of improper quality;
or a proportionate decrease in the purchase price;
or removal of the defects in the article without charge by the seller or compensation for
the expenses incurred by the buyer in removing them;
or rescission of the contract with compensation to the buyer for damages.J0
The disappointed buyer has six months from the date of delivery to present
his claim to the seller ( § 247 C.C.). If the product was purchased in a retail-
trade organization with a guarantee, this reclamation period may be extended
for the length of the guarantee calculated from the date of the sale. The statute
permits the seller to avoid liability if he can show that the buyer himself was the
sole cause of the defect (§ 248 C.C.).
In practice, it would appear that most consumers do not sue the seller in the
People's Court under Section 246 of the Civil Code. Rather, in accordance with
the provisions of the sales contract, they take appropriate steps to have the
defective product repaired or exchanged. 1I Judging from reports in the popular
'The Civil Code of the RSFSR has been translated by Whitmore Gray and Raymond N. Stults and
appears in Gray (ed.), SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School,
1965.
"Section 246 C.C. These remedies are outlined in Shapiro, Survey of Products Liability Law as
Applied to Motor Vehicles: Soviet Union, 2 INT'L LAW 146, 148 (1967). See also GIFFEN, THE
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, New York: Praeger, 1971,
Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
'Ziles. Law and the Distribution of Consumer Goods in the Soviet Union, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 212,
268-270.
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press, these remedies have been less than satisfactory. Consider the example
of refrigerators. In 1975 N. Slednikov, Director of the USSR Ministry of
Trade's Chief Administration for Wholesale Trade in Cultural Goods and
Household Appliances, reported that customers and stores rejected as defective
nearly 500,000 refrigerators, about 9 percent of that year's production. 2 A
Soviet consumer who pays 200 to 300 rubles for a refrigerator that has a latent
factory-caused defect is in a most unhappy situation. He has the option of
waiting long periods of time before the item is replaced, or he takes his chances
on the quality of work done by the Household Appliances Repair Associations.
The multiplicity of problems associated with defective merchandise and shoddy
repair work appears to pervade the entire Soviet econo my. 3 In an article
appearing in Izvestia, the author, director of a state production enterprise,
addressed himself to the suggestion that things would be improved if the repair
work on television sets could be transferred from the repair shops to the manu-
facturer:
The television repair shops of the republic Ministries of Everyday Services to the
Population cannot do prompt, reliable work because they are poorly equipped, poorly
stocked and manned by poorly trained technicians. Lots of them would like to set up
regular assembly lines for the replacement of ailing functional units in sets, and in fact
many have actually asked us to help by designing and building some of the needed
equipment. Unfortunately we cannot honor their requests. But we can appreciate how
their desire to industrialize is thwarted by the unavailability of specialized machinery,
tools and test instruments. The sorry consequence is that highly sophisticated
television sets fall into ill-equipped hands when they need service.
A regulation designed to protect the consumer states that if a color television cannot
be repaired locally within two weeks it must be returned to the factory. Since most
repair shops do not have a good, up-to-date stock of parts or the right equipment and
knowledge, this means a lot of sets with minor problems are shipped back to us. This
is very costly to the manufacturer for several reasons. For one thing, rail or air freight
costs around 15 to 20 rubles. Furthermore, we are required to pay the store a penalty
of 110 rubles. Then the actual repair work on a returned set may run as high as 200
rubles. This is because defective televisions are often treated like junk.14
Thus as far as his remedies based on the sales contract are concerned, the
Soviet consumer would seem to be in a most unfortunate predicament. He must
first exhaust the possibilities of repair or exchange, and even if he should obtain
a refund of the purchase price, with or without litigation, it is doubtful whether
such a Pyrrhic victory would be of much assistance to him, for he still does not
have a quality product. With his refund in hand, he has no choice but to spend
2You Bought a Refrigerator, taken from the March 28, 1976 issue of Pravda, translated in vol. 28
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 13, April 28, 1976, p. 9.
3See generally, Schroeder, Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse, 20 PROBLEMS OF
COMMUNISM 36 (July-August 1971).
"Customer Should Win, taken from the June 21, 1975 issue of Izvestia, translated in vol. 27
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 25, July 16, 1975, p. 19.
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it in a marketing system that resists new technology, stresses quantity over
quality, and is thoroughly imbued with a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude toward
the customer. Despite the sloganeering of the Party, from Krushchev's "goulash
Communism" down to the present, the Soviet consumer still gets what is left-
over after military orders, which occupy top priority, are filled.
IN TORT
But suppose the defective product should cause personal injury to someone,
or cause personal property to be damaged or destroyed. For example, suppose
the buyer or his friend is injured by a defectively manufactured power tool.
Under Section 444 of the Civil Code, the injured party may sue "the person who
has caused the injury," a concept broad enough to encompass both seller and
manufacturer. Privity of contract is not necessary, so even the innocent by-
stander injured by an exploding pump would have a cause of action against
the tortfeasor. In order to recover his damages, the plaintiff would have to prove
his injury and the fact that defendant caused it by some act or omission. Once
having done this, fault is presumed and the defendant is liable unless he can
establish that he acted without negligence. If the defendant shows contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the court will take this into account in
awarding damages. Unlike the rule in many jurisdictions in the United States,
contributory negligence does not defeat plaintiff's tort claim in the Soviet Union
(§ 458 C.C.). Is
From the above, it will be noted that recovery under Section 444 of the Civil
Code is based on the fault or negligence of the defendant. To be sure, plaintiff's
case is aided by a statutory presumption of law, but the defendant escapes
liability if he can show that he exercised due care in the manufacture and/or
marketing of the defective product. Under Soviet law, is it possible to hold the
manufacturer to strict liability in tort?
Yes (under § 454 of the Civil Code), if the injury is caused by an extra-
hazardous source, the tortfeasor is strictly liable, unless he can "prove that
injury arose through intent on the part of the victim or through irresistible
force." What is an "extra-hazardous source" under Soviet law? To date,
tractors, combine harvesters, automobiles, trains, boats, gas and steam
engines and, not surprisingly, explosives have all been held to fall within the
strict liability provisions of Section 454 C.C. 16 To be sure, these cases involve
"
5Articles discussing tort liability under Soviet law include: Gray, Soviet Tort Law: The New
Principles Annotated, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 180; Hazard, Personal Injury and Soviet Socialism, 65
HARV. L. REV. 545 (1952); Holman and Spinner, Bases of Liability for Tortious Injury in Soviet
Law, 22 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1936); Rudden, Soviet Tort Law, 42 NYU L. REV. 583 (1967); Tay, The
Foundations of Tort Liability in a Socialist Legal System, 19 U. TORONTO L. J. 1 (1969).
"Tay, Principles ofLiability and the "'Source of Increased Danger" in the Soviet Law of Tort, 18
INT'L& COMP. L. Q. 424, 429 (1969).
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liability of those in possession of the extra-hazardous source, II but there is no
insuperable logical difficulty in using causation in fact to find the manufacturer
not in possession to be strictly liable for releasing an inherently dangerous
product. Once this step is taken, it would be possible to extend the scope of
liability by finding an extra-hazardous source to exist in products which, al-
though not inherently dangerous when properly manufactured, become a source
of danger when defectively produced. The very fact that a product has caused
injury is itself some evidence of its dangerousness. Since sovereign immunity is
no bar to a suit by a citizen against a state enterprise manufacturer,"8 the fore-
going analysis indicates that the Soviet legal system contains the conceptual
and adjudicatory framework with which a system of products liability law may
be developed, either under Section 444, requiring negligence on the part of the
manufacturer, or under Section 454, which imposes liability without negligence
for injuries caused by especially dangerous instrumentalities, or under both
statutes. 19
But do the decision makers in the USSR really desire to develop this field of
law? Do they want to encourage litigation in the People's Court as a means of
improving the quality of production of consumer goods? Before attempting
to answer these questions, let us examine another aspect of poor quality pro-
duction, namely, in the economic contract relations between state enterprises.
I
According to Soviet law, a delivery contract is used as a means to achieve the
targets of the plan. Once he receives his production orders and delivery orders
from the planning authorities, the director of a Soviet economic enterprise is
legally obliged to enter into whatever economic contractual relations are neces-
sary in order to fulfill his planned task.' Two things characterize the life of the
Soviet manager: (1) high planned targets; (2) chronic shortages of materials."1
'"Barry, The Motor-Car in Soviet Criminal and CivilLaw, 16 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 56, 76 (1967).
"Section 446 C. C.; Barry, Governmental Tort Liability in the Soviet Union, 20 RUTGERS L.
REv. 300 (1966).
"Reference should be made to the existence of a system of social insurance in the Soviet Union.
Payments made under it normally do not cover all expenses incurred by the injured party, who is
forced by economic necessity to sue the tortfeasor for damages. See HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND
THEIR LAW, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 387.
2 See generally, Berman, Commercial Contracts in Soviet Law, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 191 (1947);
Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 128; Speer, Contract
Rights and the Planned Economy, 3 LAW AND POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 510 (1971); Wagner, The Law
of Contracts in Communist Countries, 7 ST. Louis U. L. J. 292 (1963); Yoffe and Tolstoy, The New
Civil Code of the RSFSR: A Soviet View, 15 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 1090 (1966).2 The role of the plant director in the Soviet economy has been analyzed by BERLINER, FACTORY
AND MANAGER IN THE USSR, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1957; BIENSTOCK, SCHWARZ AND
YUGOW, MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE, New York: Oxford U. Press,
1944; GRANICK, MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN THE USSR, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1954; GRANICK, THE RED EXECUTIVE, Garden City: Doubleday, 1961.
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In the early years of industrialization under the Five Year Plans, no thought was
given to the quality or attractiveness of goods.22 The main drive then was to
fulfill planned production quotas expressed in terms of weight (tons of pig iron),
length (meters of rolled steel), etc. Regardless of cost, quantity was the main
thing. 3
By the mid-1960s it had become apparent to Soviet leaders that the old
methods of administrative fiat and excessively centralized economic decision
making were inadequate to maintain a satisfactory rate of economic growth at
home and to compete with the West abroad. Inspired by the ideas of Yevsei
Liberman, reforms were introduced which were designed to increase the in-
dependence of enterprises from centralized planning authorities, evaluate their
work by the criterion of profitability, and encourage them to think in terms of
quality as well as quantity. Kosygin announced that profits, sales and rate of
return of investment were to replace fulfillment of quotas as the principal
success indicators for the Soviet enterprise.2 1 Before evaluating the progress
of these reforms, let us examine the legal framework for controlling and
promoting the quality of production in the area of economic contracts in the
USSR.
Under the delivery contract, "operative management" and not legal title, is
transferred from the supplying state enterprise to the consignee.2" According to
the Soviet Constitution, legal title to such products, which are deemed to be
"instruments and means of production," is in the state.2 6 The quality of goods
delivered must, pursuant to Section 261 of the Civil Code, "correspond to state
standards, technical specifications or samples." It is possible, however, for the
parties to agree on a higher, but not a lower, quality than that prescribed by
GOST.27
From reports in the Soviet press, it is obvious that substandard goods are
being shipped to contract consignees. By statute, the consignee "must refuse
to accept or pay for the goods," and if he has already paid for them, he is en-
titled to recover this sum ( § 261 C.C.). The statute further indicates that other
options may be open to the disappointed promisee:
However, if the defects in the goods delivered can be removed without returning
them to the supplier, the buyer has a right to demand of the supplier correction of the
"Liberman, The Soviet Economic Reform, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53, 57 (1967).23See generally, SCHWARTZ, RUSSIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2nd ed.,
1954, Chapter VII, pp. 215-293.
24Goldman, Economic Revolution in the Soviet Union, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 319 (1967).
"Section 258 C.C.
2 Constitution of the USSR, Articles 4, 6 and 10.
"Statute on Deliveries of Products Intended for Production and Technical Uses, in 2 SOVIET
STATUTES AND DECISIONS No. 2, p. 39.
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defects in the place where the goods are located or to correct the defects by his own
means at the supplier's expense.
If goods delivered correspond to state standards or technical specifications, but are
of a lower grade than that agreed upon, the buyer has a right either to accept the goods
and pay for them at the price established for goods of such grade or to refuse to accept
and pay for them. 2
If the buyer desires to take legal action against the supplier, he has six months
from the date of discovering the defect in which to file his claim. 29 It is possible
for the contract to establish a guarantee period. In such a case, the supplier is
obliged, without reimbursement, to eliminate all known defects or to replace
the product within the time period agreed upon by the parties.30
Suits brought by state enterprises for breach of delivery contracts go before
the special tribunals of State Arbitration. 3 If the contract breach is founded
upon a non-conforming shipment of defective or sub-standard products, the
Gosarbitrazh tribunal is empowered to award damages, impose a fine, and in
most cases will insist upon specific performance of the quality provisions of the
delivery contract. Section 266 of the Civil Code provides:
In the event of delivery of goods of improper quality or of goods in incomplete units,
the buyer recovers from the supplier the established penalty and, in addition, the
damages caused by such delivery, calculated without deducting the penalty.
In 1972, the regulations provided for a 20 percent fine of the value of the ship-
ment in the event of delivery of goods below state specifications.32 Although the
fines, penalties and forfeitures provided by law are apparently mandatory and
may not be waived by the parties,33 there is much evidence to suggest that con-
tract breaches are often forgiven if not forgotten. This is especially true if the
sub-standard goods have been shipped by a large and important supplier. It
would apparently not be in the best long term interests of the disappointed
consignee to complain about a poor quality shipment before Gosarbitrazh.
This would antagonize the supplier who would most certainly reciprocate by
refusing to do a favor in the future.3 ' Perhaps more important in explaining
the reluctance which state enterprises have for taking formal legal action
"'Section 261 C.C.
2 Section 262 C.C.
"Except where the buyer himself is solely responsible for the defects, e.g. when he fails to
properly store the delivered goods; cf. Statute on Deliveries, supra note 27, p. 42; see also Bratus,
The Contract ofDelivery of Goods in Soviet Law, 1962 J. Bus. L. 262, 267; Speer, op. cit., note 20.3 H -AzARD, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE USSR, London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1953, pp.
50-51.32FEIWEL, THE SOVIET QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, NEW YoRK: Praeger, 1972, pp.
405-406.3 3Loeber, op. cit., note 20, p. 142.3
'FEIWEL, op. cit., note 32, suggests that a sued supplier will get even by deliberately defaulting
on future deliveries.
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against one another is the fact that despite the recent reforms stressing cost-
consciousness, profits and quality work, the all-important success indicator in
the Soviet economy remains plan fulfillment. As long as defective products are
counted in the fulfillment of planned tasks, there will be enterprise directors
who will be tempted to release them, and other directors, forced to operate
under constant material shortages, who will accept delivery of them "as is"
and make the best of it. State enterprise directors in the USSR, unless they are
active in the field of military procurement, do not have to worry about pleasing
the customer. They are primarily concerned about winning the "paper war"
with the ministries.
One caveat, however. If a breach of delivery contract case goes to Gosar-
bitrazh, that body may refer a matter involving a delivery of defective goods
to the Procurator General for possible criminal action against the manufac-
turer.3" Under the term "economic crime," Soviet criminal law includes the
production of goods of poor quality.36 Article 152 of the Criminal Code of the
RSFSR provides:
Issuing poor-quality, nonstandard, or incomplete products. Issuing from an
industrial enterprise, repeatedly or on a large scale, products of poor quality or not
conforming with standards or technical conditions, or incomplete products, by the
director, chief engineer, or head of the department of technical control, or by persons
occupying other offices who fulfill the duties of the persons listed, shall be punished by
deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years, or by correctional tasks
for a term not exceeding one year, or by dismissal from office.37
On 8 August 1975, Pravda reported that in a case heard in Tashkent City Court,
former officials and employees of the Shark furniture manufacturing firm were
tried for producing poor-quality merchandise and for deceiving the state with
padded reports. G. Radzhabov, the firm's former director, was sentenced to two
years' deprivation of freedom; A. Arushanov, former chief bookkeeper, was
given a one year probationary sentence; M. Chernova and T. Ashirov, both
of whom had worked as head of the enterprise's quality control department,
were sentenced to correctional labor.3 8
Turning out defective products is not in itself a criminal offense, but the
systematic and large-scale release of such production, especially after official
warnings have been given, does make out a violation of Section 152. In a recent
31FAINSOD, How RUSSIA is RULED, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1967, pp. 4 1 1-414; Procedure
for Forwarding to Agencies of the Procuracy Notices of Instances of Delivery of Poor-Quality and
Incomplete Products, in 2 SOVIET STATUTES AND DECISIONS No. 1. pp. 79-82.
36Berman, op. cit., note 20, p. 195.
3 7Berman. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES, Cambridge: Harvard
U. Press, 1966, pp. 204-205. Section 157 of the RSFSR Criminal Code covers retail outlets.
"No Matter How Twisted the String, taken from the August 8, 1975 issue of Pravda, translated
in vol. 27 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 32, September 3, 1975, p. 16.
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issue of Soviet Life, an account is given of the trial under Section 152 of the
factory director and chief engineer of a plant producing a kind of yogurt-like
soft drink. The Kursk Regional Court sentenced the defendants to two years
imprisonment each.
Commenting on the trial, the Soviet journalist who authored the article
wrote:
But cases like these do not usually reach the courts. There are other
preventives: state inspection agencies and public organizations like the People's
Control Bodies. Public opinion itself is the greatest deterrent. But should officials
bypass these deterrents and ignore warnings, the case goes to court."
The threat of imprisonment is thus a factor which the enterprise director con-
templating release of sub-standard goods must take into account. Berliner,
in his study made in the 1950s based on interviews with DPs, did not believe
that Soviet managerial behavior was appreciably affected by the threat of a
criminal sanction:
The attitude toward a prison sentence as communicated by the informants is that
anyone occupying a responsible position in Soviet society inevitably has enough
transgressions recorded in his police dossier to send him to prison for life. This
information is brought to light only if "they" decide to prosecute him as an example to
others. The fall of the axe is looked upon as the act of an impersonal fate normally
striking only those who run into unusual and extreme difficulties or run afoul of a
powerful Party official or vindictive personal enemy.' 0
Conclusion
The legal system of the USSR possesses the technical tools, substantive and
procedural, which are required in order to construct and develop a body of
products liability law. Statutory provisions imposing tort liability, founded on
both fault as well as on the creation of an increased source of danger, are avail-
able for application by both ordinary civil courts as well as Gosarbitrazh.
Administrative regulations and governmental decrees abound. Violation of
their quality of production provisions could be used by a person who has been
damaged by defective production as evidence of breach of a legal duty relevant
to the issue of negligence in tort. There can be no question that theoretically,
at least, the award of damages to the citizen consumer or state enterprise
consignee would serve to deter manufacturers from releasing defective products.
But do the Russians want to go this route? In the opinion of this writer,
apparently not. And the reason is not because they are unaware of the existence
3
'Feofanov, Management is Respon. 'ble, SOVIET LIFE, August 1975, p. 45.
'
0 BERLINER, op. cit., note 21, p. 314. Accord: GRANICK, THE RED EXECUTIVE, Op. cit., note 21,
p. 30.
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of the notion of products liability. The E.E.C. has recently put together a draft
directive on the approximation of the laws of member states relating to products
liability; under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the Strasbourg Draft
Convention on Products Liability, seeking to obtain unification of the substan-
tive rules through international agreement in a somewhat larger geographical
area, is completed and has already been distributed for discussion; the Hague
Conference on Private International Law has produced a convention concerned
with the law governing products liability in situations where the defendant did
not transfer the product, or the right to use the product, to the plaintiff. And
of course the Russians are familiar with our own products liability law, which
is the most voluminous and highly developed in the world.
In order to understand the Soviet attitude, factors other than ignorance of
the law must be explored. First and foremost, what impact would a widespread
products liability system in the USSR have on the political control which the
Communist Party exercises over the Soviet economy? From an economic point
of view, what effect would the award of products liability damages have on the
ability of the responsible state enterprise to perform its planned tasks? What
would happen to the class structure of Soviet society if the consumer were
encouraged to recoup from the seller or manufacturer the losses caused him
by a defective product?
The uncertainties and risks associated with these possible developments
argue against their acceptance by the Party. This does not mean, however, that
the Party is willing to live with the enormous waste and inefficiency inherent
in poor quality production. Indeed, one of the major themes sounded by key-
note speakers at the XXV Party Congress was the urgent need to improve the
quality of life, which includes, of course, the quality of production."
This kind of sloganeering is, of course, a long story in the Soviet Union.
Under no circumstances is the Party prepared to adopt any measure to improve
the economy if it were to weaken the controls which the Party considers neces-
sary in order to stay in power. Rather than permit the growth of too much in-
dependence at managerial levels, the Party hopes to improve the quality of
production by exhorting compliance with state standards. This involves product
certification and the award of the "Seal of Quality." Above all, one notices in
the literature a plea for a restructuring of the administrative machinery. For
example, the 18 May 1976 issue of Pravda contained this statement:
Product certification, commodity evaluation offices and even conferral of the State
Seal of Quality do not always resolve the problem entirely. Most likely it could be dealt
with by the quality control departments at enterprises and by the quality inspection
'Over half of the November 1975 issue of KOMMUNIST was devoted to the implementation of
this theme. See, for example, Sapilov, Sovershenstvovat' Upravlenie Kachestvom Produtsii, No. 16,
KOMMUNIST, pp. 43-52 (Nov. 1975).
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services of various agencies. Alas, there are too many instances in which products with
the authoritative stamp of the quality control department are returned to the factory
by trade warehouses because of defects. To a significant extent, the reason for this lies
in the organizational principles that govern the activities of quality subdivisions. I
refer chiefly to the question of whose interests-the producer's or the consumer's-the
quality control department is protecting. 2
The author of the above, noting the conflict of interest in the activities of a
quality control department within a factory, suggests that the solution lies in
an administrative shake-up:
Here we might consider organizational solutions to the problem. One might be to
create specialized interagency production control subdivisions. Existing interagency
organizations, especially the USSR State Standards Committee, could be used as such
a subdivision. In this case the quality control departments at enterprises should be
completely transferred to the jurisdiction of such an interagency organization.
Obviously one might find other compromise solutions in which a consumer repre-
sentative would be included on the staff of an enterprise's quality control department
with authority to make the final decision. Without the signature of this representative,
products could not be sent to a receiver.43
The possibility of improving the quality of production by adopting the dis-
cipline of a market system is obviously taboo, but one Soviet observer proposed
that if the profit plan is not fulfilled because of defective production, the plant
director and his first deputy, the chief engineer, should have 20-30 percent
deducted from their salaries, with deprivation of bonuses from all sources until
the losses have been recouped by additional work.44
To be sure, legal methods have also been proposed to combat poor quality
production. The pages of Sotsialistecheskaea Zakonnost' are filled with ideas
ofhow the Procuracy can increase its vigilance in supervising the observance
of statutes and regulations relating to the quality of production.
45
On a somewhat different scale, great reliance is placed on a project which
would collect if not codify all of the laws pertaining to the economy, a kind of
Svod Zakonov which could be put on the shelf of every enterprise director.
4 6
"Quality Control Department Without Compromise, taken from the May 18, 1976 issue of
Pravda, translated in vol. 28 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PREss No. 20, June 16, 1976, pp. 22.
"
3Loc. Cit., ibid.
"Personal Material Responsibility for Enterprise Executives, taken from the May 1974 issue of
Planovoye Khozyaistvo, translated in vol. 26 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 42,
November 13, 1974, pp. 7-8.
"See, e.g., Mal'kov, Deistvennost' Prokurorskogo Nadzora v Borbe Za Kachestvo Produtsii
SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA ZAKONNoST' No. 6, pp. 17-20 (June 1976).
"It is anticipated that the collection will comprise about 70-80 volumes, a number which could
prove to be too cumbersome to be of such assistance. Still unresolved is the great debate over the
introduction of a code of economic law to govern relations between state enterprises. See Laptev,
The Economy of Economic Law. 14 SOVIET LAW & GOVERNMENT No. 2, pp. 41-58 (Fall 1975).
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In sum, it is unlikely that Soviet law will develop a system of products liability
law such as we have in the United States. The citizen consumer is lucky to have
even a defective product, and the directors of state enterprises realize that they
need each other's cooperation if they are to fulfill planned targets and qualify
for high salaries and bonuses. The values of krugovaia poruka will probably
continue to condition the behavior of Soviet managers for some time to come.
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